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LOOKING BACK TOWARDS A BLEAK FUTURE FOR
LAWYERS
by
Harry Glasbeek*
During the 32 years of my formal academic career, I sought to get a better understanding of the nature of law. I hasten to add that I did not undertake these studies for the pure joy of understanding. I had an unhidden
agenda.
My position was-and is-that capitalist relations of production require
the exploitation and subjugation of the majority of people. As a lawyer, I
wanted to identify how law and its institutions contributed to the maintenance and perpetuation of this undesirable regime. I wanted to help people
dismantle it. It took me a little while to come to terms with the fact that law
and its institutions do not provide fertile soil for the waging of transformative struggles. I now treat this as a verity and have much more modest
ambitions for the uses of law as a tool of progress.
After all, if our political economy had been feudal-as it once was-we
would have expected to have-as we did have-a legal system that made
feudalism live and survive for as long as concrete economic conditions
warranted this. If a socialist scheme should reign, we would expect to find
a set of legal doctrines, practices and institutions that supported socialism's
goals and values. Unsurprisingly, then, capitalism has demanded, and has
spawned, a legal system which supports capitalism and which is not easily
amenable to manipulations that undermine the structural and ideological
needs of capitalism. In the present climate of capitalist triumph, it is much
more likely that capitalism and thinking capitalists will be able to use law
even more directly and efficiently than ever to achieve its and their aims.
The potential for the progressive use of law is even more ephemeral than it
ever was. Indeed, the major lesson that I draw from the last two decades is
that Canadian law has been used effectively to blunt the possibility of radical change.
This piece sets out how I now understand why I began my academic
journey with more hope than, objectively speaking, was warranted. It then
turns to show that law's claim to be a liberal democratic institution, rather
than a capitalist one, has enabled powerful economic actors to deepen their
hold on the economic and political levers of power to the detriment of our
democratic aspirations.
I finished my graduate work in 1965. At the time, profound changes
seemed eminently achievable, if not inevitable. Capitalism was still enjoying the longest period of continued success it had generated, at least in
those parts of the world to which we referred-rather revealingly-as the
First World. But, it was not a quiescent time.
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Outside the realm of the advanced industrial nations, there were two
major factors which affected the way in which the richer States could conduct their affairs. First, there was the political, social and economic impact
of not only the apparent viability of the Soviet Union, but also of its ability
to pose a credible military and economic counter to the expansions and
adventures of the West. It provided a vivid example of the potential of alternate social relations. Second, and related of course, was the explosion of the
drive for independence by formerly colonized peoples. These cries for liberty and autonomy had a marked effect on the way in which we began to
think about the need for collective and individual emancipation, for them
and for ourselves. The so-called "Bandung" project, or development theory,
which emerged involved the formation of national democracies about whose
nature fierce contests erupted. Were they to be bourgeois democracies or
socialist ones? This became a focus of the Cold War struggles as the major
blocs sought military, ideological and economic advantage. Contemporaneously, the significance of the nation state as an autonomous set of institutions
was reinforced. The attempt to develop an alliance of non-aligned nation
States to act as a third protagonist added fuel to this boiling cauldron.
Among other things, these struggles were reflected in the evolution and
moulding of the United Nations and its apparatus. All of this gave added
impetus to already explosive domestic movements for a more profound and
institutionalized respect for different identities, distinct cultures, etc.
In Canada and the U.S., the post-war period was very different from the
pre-war one. The U.S. had emerged as the economic and military power. Its
dominant economic role in rebuilding Europe and its burgeoning militaryindustrial complex delivered a veritable boom, at least when compared to
the immediate pre-war period. The depression still had its stranglehold on
the economy at that time. Canada's economy, so closely integrated with
that of the U.S., was swept along on the wave of post-war relative prosperity. This, together with the evolving world-wide ferment over political
rights gave a spur to already aroused hopes and claims for a different set of
social relations. There had been promises that, after the war, things would
be different, materially and politically. For instance, it is worth recalling
that, in 1944, President Roosevelt had proposed a new Bill of Rights. It was
to contain constitutional guarantees of jobs which would pay well enough
to provide adequate food, clothing and recreation; it promised access to
affordable housing ("the right of every family to a decent home" were the
words used), the right to a good education and adequate medical care, as
well as "protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident
and unemployment". While these proposals to constitutionalize a different
set of rights came to naught, what is important is why Roosevelt made
them. He candidly told us: "after this war is won we must be prepared to
move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of
human happiness and well-being." It is but one piece of evidence that populations, disaffected by the workings of capitalism, had been enticed to
make sacrifices on the basis that they had the right to aspire to a new world
order. It was now acknowledged by the elites that something had to be done
to preserve the system.

Vol. 19

Looking Back

This crude sketch of the well-known should suffice to understand the
atmosphere of the period in which I began my academic journeys. In the
United States and Canada there were strong pressures on the elites to
respond to demands for economic and political changes, some of which
were animated by what was happening elsewhere in the world. Not the
least of these was the example of the relative, and apparently continuously
improving, material security of people who lived in social democratic,
democratic socialist or self-styled communist nation States. At the same
time as a fierce ideological war-and, on occasion, a concrete war-was
waged against these anti-capitalist regimes and models, concessions were
made to demonstrate to our populations that material welfare and compassion were compatible with our political economies. The material wherewithal was there and, though they did not come automatically, the State
intervened to provide an increasing number of safeguards against excessive
economic insecurity.
This is not to look back through rosy glasses: the welfare State developed far more slowly here than it did in those western nations with a much
longer history of democratic socialist/social democratic politics and it
always did remain far less generous. Thus, in 1983, Canada and the U.S.
ranked still only 1 3 th and 1 4 th on a list of 18 comparable economies in
terms of spending on social programmes (O'Conner, 1989). Nonetheless,
the scope and nature of the amelioration were impressive. By the early
1970s, a whole slew of benefit and entitlement schemes had been put in
place in Canada. Many were new. For example, in the 1960s the CPP/QPP
scheme began to take shape and, by 1970, the Canada Assistance Plan, a
universal social assistance regime, covering the old, the disabled, etc., had
been established. Schemes of older vintage, such as the Unemployment
Insurance, workers' compensation and statutory collective bargaining
regimes, were much enriched. In addition, huge State expenditures were
undertaken to provide universal access to quality education and health care.
The capitalist State was demonstrating that it could, and did, provide government for all the people and that it could, and did, deliver material wellbeing for the masses. There was no need to look to other political systems
for democratic rights and economic sufficiency.
Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to characterize
these social wage advances as self-serving measures by the powerful. It is
plausible now to argue that the captains of industry had learned their lesson
from the depression: there was a need to maintain aggregate demand to
underpin mass consumption and, hence, it suited them-while it was easily
affordable-to give workers the means to bargain for a decent wage and to
complement that with enhancements of the social wage. But, they
remained intent on not giving away too much, either in material wealth
terms or in terms of power sharing. This hindsight view has some merit: it
is true that, even during those heady days, many people did not share in the
national increases in wealth. In the midst of this period, for instance,
Michael Harrington wrote The Other America (1962), in which he claimed
that between 40 and 50 million Americans continued to live in poverty.
This gives some plausibility to an argument that holds that the changes
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were not very important, not reflective of a new beginning, but, rather,
sugar coatings of the same old pill. Yet, this belies the context in which
these changes were wrought.
The new and richer welfare regimes and the fuller provision of education
and health care-in Canada, at least-were not obtained in isolation from
other political and social struggles. People everywhere were demanding
different ententes and relations. This stretched from uprisings in the Soviet
Bloc-Hungary, Czechoslovakia-where the claims were for more
national autonomy, more political democracy and improved consumer satisfaction, to the upheaval in Paris where the struggle was overtly anti-capitalist, to Quebec where the creation of a modem State evoked linguistic and
cultural demands, at the same time as it evinced a thirst for a changed political regime. In Quebec, this sentiment was captured by the phrase "maitre
chez-nous", which denoted dissatisfaction with private economic control of
the State, tout court, rather than opposition to the private economic control
by English/American wealth owners. In the United States, the race issue
became a central struggle. It, too, did not just revolve around one axis. Not
only was there a push to end the repellent discrimination against black people in terms of their formal rights under and according to law, that is, in
terms of their elemental civil liberties, but a great deal of the contest had to
do with the grinding poverty of the black population, with their class position. Indeed, some of the more militant-and, for a short time, more successful-of the groups advocated a separate but equal politics, one which
envisaged a totally different set of relations of production. In a similar vein,
it is pertinent to note in this simplified account of this turbulent period that
many of those who opposed the war in Vietnam did so on the bases that the
war was racist (we all remember the stand taken by Muhammed Ali, then
Cassius Clay) and served capitalists' interests, as did all racism (we all
remember Martin Luther King's speech to that effect). Women found articulate and effective leaders to present the case that they had been systematically excluded from the political and economic world and that so-called
liberal law did much to maintain their disadvantaged positions and to perpetuate patriarchical power relations. And, although still very muted, there
were some stirrings about the oppression of indigenous populations.
To explain the advances in respect of the welfare State as minor concessions made by capital to solidify its economic hold, then, would be a
decontextualized explanation. It would characterize the changes as economic ones, narrowly defined, when the period was one of turbulent political movements which questioned both the material outcomes of the
dominant economic model and the political impact of the dominant political economic model on democratic aspirations. The changes were not just
better trade union rights and a wider-based and more generous social wage
to advance economic well-being; a massively different approach to race
and gender relations emerged, as did a different discourse and set of practices around political participatory rights. Integration and equal opportunity
were cornerstones of the new circumstance which gave a deeper meaning
to the importance of improved economic protections.
It is this wider understanding of what emerged as a post-war entente
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which explains why the notion that a new beginning had been made took
hold, one which portended an unstoppable trend: the steady accretion of
rights would lead to emancipation. Borrowing from the work of Marshall
(1965), the idea of inclusive citizenship was portrayed as an achievable
ideal. Marshall had defined citizenship as the complex of civil, economic,
political and social rights and duties which gave individuals their status in
their polity. The scope of citizenship, of the status of individuals, was
always in a State of flux as the extent of rights and responsibilities, as well
as the respect bestowed on their identity, were politically contested. But,
the acknowledgement that these age-old battles now should be referred to
as being struggles over the nature of something designated as "citizenship",
that is, that they could be characterized in a quasi-scientific way, denoted a
belief that progress had been made and would likely continue to be made
on the road to freedom and liberty. That is, the term "citizenship" was not
thought of merely as a descriptive one which could aid the assessment of
the State of rights and obligations, but it had a normative tinge. During this
period it was implicitly assumed that we had set off on a positive curve,
that there would be a steady upward march, an accretion of rights, culminating in the eventual sovereignty and autonomy of all peoples.
To give this abstract claim some substance, I refer to the language used
by the leaders in my sphere of study, labour relations lawyers. By 1967,
Harry Arthurs, a disciple of Bora Laskin (who had written in a similar vein
in 1963), coined the phrase "industrial citizenship" to describe the status of
Canadian workers. Workers' progress had been such that it was no longer
useful to think of them as individuals subjugated by the unfettered power
of the employing classes. Even workers who had not won collective bargaining rights-and the non-unionized still comprised the majority of
workers!-had so many protections from crude exploitation that one could
think of them as having considerable rights, as having citizenship rights,
where citizenship was thought of as connoting autonomy and participatory
rights in respect of decision-making about conditions of employment. The
ever improving provisions for a minimum wage, limitations on working
hours, the right to notice when dismissed, the guarantee of paid vacations,
etc., as well as the development of anti-discrimination regimes which
should protect workers from invidious treatment when seeking employment and/or promotion and/or trying to protect their jobs, were listed as
evidence for the new status of employees. These constraints on the way the
economically powerful could treat the economically vulnerable were a
manifestation of the growing status of the formerly remedy-less and rightless members of the working class. And, when it came to the organized
members of the workforce, this was true in spades. Not only had their bargaining clout for economic welfare been increased enormously, their right
to participate in rule-making and decision-making--directly and indirectly
via their unions-had been enhanced dramatically. Their right to the rule of
law, via the grievance arbitration system, reflected their new status: they
were industrial citizens.
Similar claims were made in many spheres of social and economic activity. For instance, as it became obvious during these relatively bountiful

Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice

2001

economic times that some large corporate actors were dominating the
scene, giving them the leeway to exercise quasi-governmental powers and
to make decisions which amounted to the making of public policy (Dahl,
1966, 1970), fears that this might lead to an undermining of democratic
practices were rebuffed by pointing out that the citizenry had more than
enough power to look after itself. It is in this way that we can understand
Galbraith's sanguine-and much cited-belief that, through unions, consumer associations, political lobbies, pension funds, upgraded legal rights
to challenge discriminatory practices and the like, people could exercise
effective countervailing power to what once would have been perceived as
the unchallengeable economic and political might of the wealthy classes.
This was a democratization of sorts: private policy-making could be made
accountable to private power brokers who did not own wealth. Americans
had become citizens with muscle because of the aggregation of economic
and political rights which had been bestowed on them. Large corporations
would not be able to treat people with contempt. (Galbraith, 1958, 1979).
In this spirit, the famous debate about whether corporations owed a duty to
anything but their shareholders-colloquially referred to as the Berle/Dodd
debate-was decided to have been won by Dodd. He had argued that corporations should act with a view to the good of society as a whole. In the
1960s this gathered an enormous amount of intellectual and popular support (including that of Dodd's adversary, Berle), putting more conservative
economists and lawyers on the defensive (J.Wiener, 1964). The wellknown work, The Corporationin Modern Society (Mason, 1960), reflected
this growing belief that corporations should be socially responsible citizens. It is interesting to note that the most vigorous riposte, The Attack on
Corporate America, (Johnson,1978), came when the citizenship project
was sputtering. Before that, in the early 1970s, the popularized view that
corporations were to accept the responsibilities which came with the citizenship rights they enjoyed along with the rest of us was transliterated into
forceful arguments that managers of large, publicly traded corporations
should use their discretion to make decisions which take into account the
interests of workers, their communities and environment, as well as those
of the consuming public. Shareholders, it was bravely suggested, were just
one worthy interest group (Cary, 1974). The thinking behind this approach
was that, if corporations were alternative sources of government-type decision-making, then a polity comprised by citizens of equal standing required
evenhanded treatment of all those citizens by these powerful citizens who
had combined to form a corporation. Citizenship required all citizens to
look after all other citizens. A sense of community, one which mirrored
that underlying the creation of the welfare State, should pervade private
decision-making.
It will have been noted that I used the term status to describe the idea of
citizenship. This was done purposely. What use of the idea of citizenship
signified was that there had been progress in the sense that there was clear
evidence of a transcendence of class relations. It was a signifier that the
polity was not a class-divided one in which one class necessarily and systematically oppressed the other. It was possible for a market economy to
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treat all people within it as equals, as owing no allegiance or homage to any
other person unless they chose, by freely contracting, to offer their allegiance or pay homage to another. All had the same status; all were citizens.
What this line of argument suggests is that responses by the elites to the
economic and political demands made by the masses during the post-war
period and which often were motivated by the hope of a different set of
political economic relations, examples of which could be seen to exist,
were concerned to counter any perceived need for a non-capitalist regime.
As noted, these changes were occurring at the same time as nation States,
such as the U.S.A. and Canada, were fighting real and ideological wars
against communism, socialism and the independence movements of peoples who might reject capitalism or, worse, lend support to the Soviet
Union or China. The adventures in Chile, Vietnam, Cuba etc., provide
examples, if any are needed. At home, red-baiting, the purging of leftists
from trade unions, universities, government posts, are on the record. In
these contexts it was important to our elites to demonstrate that capitalism
and democracy were compatible. The idea of a progressively richer citizenship supported this agenda.
The picture painted was that there were no distinct classes which were in
perpetual conflict; there was but one class, that of the full-fledged citizen.
Again, it is hardly worthwhile to marshal evidence of this well-known
aspect of the agenda of the elites. Just as today we find ideologues who are
trying to convince us that what we have is the best of all worlds and we
should not try to change a thing-hence the absurdity of an argument such
as that we have reached The End of History (Fukuyama, 1993)--the intellectual gatekeepers of the time were propounding The End of Ideology,
(Bell, 1965) at the same time as an all-out ideological war was being waged
against leftist tendencies. And, at another end of this paradoxical spectrum,
(somewhat later, indicating how long and hard-fought this battle for the
minds of the people was) one would have found Peter Drucker contend that
those foolish enough to think socialism might be the answer were ignorant
of their own circumstances. Not only was the welfare State looking after
the working classes, the working classes were already in control of the
economy through their private pension fund holdings. If socialism meant
the ownership of the means of production by the workers, America was
already a socialist State. (Drucker, 1976).
This crude sketch suggests that, for a while, an alternative vision to that
which underpinned the existing relations of production presented a plausible alternative, one which had to be countered. Concessions had to be
made. An enormous amount of effort went into the consolidation of capitalism's hegemony. In the process, a great number of economic, political
and legal victories were won by the formerly severely oppressed classes
and groupings. The fact that I now see these victories as blunting the edge
of transformative politics does not negate the fact that the progress made
was real and satisfying, particularly for lawyers.
Precisely because many of the oppressions and repressions had been
endorsed by law-the limitations on collective actions by workers, the
right not to contract with any particular person (which permitted racist and
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sexist decision-making by powerful contractors), the right to pursue profits
transliterated into a legal duty for corporate managers, etc.-they were to
be alleviated by making new laws. This called for expertise and lawyers'
participation. At the same time, lawyers had become increasingly involved
with political activists as the existing laws were used to punish those who
were seeking change by means of extra-legal methods-sit-ins, wildcat
strikes, illegal demonstrations, political strikes by unions only endowed
with economic strike powers, etc. Lawyers were involved in asking the
judiciary (as the repository of status quo rules) to make new laws which
better reflected the new socio/political entente which was nigh. All this
made it look and feel as if law and lawyers were at the centre of the movement for change. The academic milieu in which I was working was undergoing a make-over which spoke to these palpable gyrations.
Apostles of the rather old Realist scholarship were coming to the fore. In
an environment in which the courts were increasingly used as tools for
change-with some notable successes, such as those won in the Earl Warren Supreme Court in the U.S., sustaining hope about this venue as a useful
one for much longer than was warranted-the judiciary (certainly at the
appellate level) was increasingly seen as a political institution. In this context, the mantra that formalistic reasoning was legal reasoning had less and
less cachet. Increasingly, judges were seen to be law-makers. This meant
that their political views and beliefs were all-important. Unsurprisingly, it
became fashionable to do what had been unthinkable before: to study
judge-made decisions as reflections of the background, experiences and
predilections of the judges. Jurimetrics was "in" in law schools and social
science studies. The popularly pervasive mystique of an ethereal judiciary,
floating above the political system, was fading, at least, in law schools.
More importantly, those who perceived the judiciary as a political decisionmaking venue were concerned about its inability and/or unwillingness to
deal with the political demands made on it. One set of arguments was that,
if the decisions sought required policy-making, not only the background,
experience and predilection of a judge might get in the way, but also the
nature of dispute-creation and resolution in the judicial forum was an
obstacle. Policy issues, by definition, are polycentric and the adversary
process does not lend itself very well to dealing with these kinds of issues.
In law schools, infected by the cries for more citizenship rights, selfstyled progressive lawyers begin to call for keeping the judiciary out of
important decision-making. The reasoning was that legislators and administrative tribunals, which could employ non-judicial methods to deal with
the difficult problems which were arising out of meeting the new expectations and aspirations of society, ought to be given more prominence. And,
as new legal rights and obligations were enshrined, there was a more obvious need to consider their full impacts, political, social, economic, cultural,
etc. In law schools, curricula began to reflect these sentiments. Lawyers-tobe were told that the law dealt with the plight of the vulnerable as well as
with the welfare of the rich, even if it did not do so very well as yet, and it
should be studied to identify its positive impacts and remaining lacunae.
The implications were that law and lawyers were part and parcel of the
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social upheaval and that, in law schools, the starting position was that interdisciplinary and empirical work needed to be done to understand and further the citizenship-enhancing rights of these social movements. A plethora
of courses made their way into the curricula. Initially, they were "Law
and..." courses, such as Law and Poverty, Law and Women, Law and
Native Title...., now acknowledged and refined fields of research and
teaching. Then these courses were radical departures and their introduction
led to many fierce contests.
The law schools, imbued with a sense that it was part of their obligation
to help along the very visible reform processes, set up clinical teaching
streams. While, in theory, this was advocated as a neutral and sensible way
to teach law in context, in practice, this development was largely confined
to teaching students about the workings of law-mostly non-judicially
administered law-as it affected poor people who needed services. In addition, academic lawyers were involved in such things as grievance arbitrations, the drafting and administration of human rights codes, the creation of
operational rules for any of the many new administrative agencies spawned
by the torrent of legislative changes, writing for law reform bodies, drafting of the recommended legal changes, etc. While some of the motivation
may have been careerism and plain greed, there was also a good deal of
noblesse oblige and, more pertinent to this account, a new sanguinity that
lawyers were not mere politically disinterested technicians, but involved
social scientists and engineers.
Academic work reflected these trends. There was a distinct movement to
study law in context, albeit the scope of that context was not determined
with much precision. Traditional lawyers who had made judicial decisions
and the formal reasoning process to which judges claimed to adhere the
centre of their universe, now were fighting to maintain their prestige which
had been unquestioned for a long time. Law & Society became a recognized branch for scholarly research, basing itself on empirical inquiry into
the impact of law, whether made by judges, legislators or regulators. The
study of anthropology was coming to be seen as germane to an understanding of what was law and what its sources were, other than those which traditionalists in Western societies had presented them to be, etc.
Law appeared to be pivotal to a dynamic reform process which, procedurally and substantively, was giving liberalism a new fillip. Not only was
there an increased awareness of the need to safeguard individualistic rights,
but there was also a perceptible recognition that there was a need to respect
collectives and groups to give meaning and substance to the enhancement
of individualistic rights. This is the context which gave many progressive
academics the notion that law could be used as a progressive tool. What is
notable about this perception is that it was founded on two threadbare
assumptions, at least they seem so in hindsight.
The vision was that a democratically accountable government, imbued
with the dominant ideology of liberal pluralism, could be driven in the right
direction by progressive activists. State intervention with the unfettered
uses of private or public power was seen as the means and the norm. Lawyers involved in this process saw the legislature-and, to a lesser extent,
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the executive-as the site of struggles and initiatives. The courts were to
play supporting roles and, if they were obstructionists, should be marginalized. What tended to be downplayed-unconsciously, no doubt-was the
relationship between capital and the modern State and the nature and role
of judicially-made law in a capitalist political economy. A short discussion
of these blind spots follows.
When the State is persuaded to intervene in the operation of the market,
it makes this decision politically. To implement it, however, this political
decision is given the form of a law. In this way it can be administered and
enforced. Precisely because a law is not self-fulfilling, its administration,
interpretation and enforcement matter. The role of the functionaries used to
draft the law and set up the apparatus for its execution, administration,
interpretation and enforcement, becomes pivotal to the way in which the
original political decision will fare. As lawyers are deeply implicated in all
these processes, they tend to be perceived as legal processes, rather than
political ones. Thus, while activists did go to the courts to strike down discriminatory practices, administrative decisions and oppressive police
behaviour-more so in the U.S. than in Canada-from an activists' perspective during this period, legislation was law.
In one sense, at least, lawyers were right about the significance of lawyers' participation in these political processes. Once a political decision
takes the form of law, the discourse which governs the application of that
decision becomes legal discourse. Lawyers are the controllers of that discourse. In the words of Maureen Cain-who described lawyers as "conceptive ideologists"-they are the agents and translators of the bourgeoisie and
the "creators of the language into which they translate". (Cain, 1979) In
practical terms this means that, once a political decision takes a legal form,
it will be mediated by the dominant legal culture. The decision, now cast as
a rule or rules, will be interpreted by reference to existing legal categories
and rhetoric. While this is a rather vague statement, some rather precise
features of its implications can be identified.
Lawyers believe that what is special about law as an institution is that
decision-making is based on rationality, in sharp juxtaposition to political
decision-making which is founded on the outcome of power struggles, i.e.,
the very opposite of rationality. Once a political decision takes the form of
law, these conceptive ideologists will transform potential political contests
over its scope and meaning into debates between protagonists who are presumed to be in dispute only over the proper reading of the rule according to
criteria which lawyers-as advocates, tribunals or courts-have said are
applicable. They are not to act as if there is no shared world view; they are
not to question the legitimacy of the decision-makers, provided they are
given participatory rights.
Here I note that, inevitably, a lot of the trappings of the legal apparatus
are about portraying our legal decision-making bodies-administrative
agencies and courts-as politically independent and indifferent. Further, it
is a truism that many of the challenges brought by the would-be progressive legal actors are challenges which complain about the lack of real participatory rights of their vulnerable clienteles. There is an endless quest to
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oblige officials, agencies and tribunals to play by rules devised to create
fairer processes and better formal participatory rights. The model pursued
is to make these functionaries act more like courts do in the strictly legal
system because the judicial process is idealized as the guarantor of evenhanded and fair treatment of individual contestants. Indeed, courts have
been given the task to monitor non-judicial decision-makers and, naturally
enough, they believe that the more the decision-maker approximates judgelike behaviour, the better the decision-making process is. This approach
makes sense only if it is assumed that courts-and their established practices-are ideally suited to supervise disputes within a shared set of values
and that this consensus underpins all political decisions which take the
form of law. If the values were contestible in a deep sense, the judiciary's
pose of neutrality would not be apposite to the settlement of disputes arising out of value-laden conflicts. They would have to be resolved politically, irrationally, by the exercise of power.
From the point of view of the vulnerable on whose behalf the would-be
progressive lawyers sought to push their legislative initiative, this devolution of decision-making to a system based on rationality and formal due
process has distinct advantages. It is devilishly hard to get any political
change which helps the dispossessed and, having got it, it would be very
tough to have to wage the same battle over and over again in the political
sphere. Being embedded in the legal sphere gives a victory a permanence
which is most helpful, both instrumentally and symbolically. However,
there are also serious disadvantages which tend to be underestimated, in
part because they are not easily calculable.
Fighting on the legal terrain costs money and time. Very often the adversaries, the so-called forces of conservatism, have more of both those precious commodities. More intangible, but more important, is the fact that
once the political struggle is transformed into a legal one run by legal functionaries-no matter how sympathetic they are to the people and the causes
they support-there is a loss of the need to act in solidarity, militantlyindeed, this is often discouraged by the supportive lawyers fighting for
legitimacy as lawyers-and there may be an alienating effect. The very
movement which was formed to bring about change and which might have
been built on to bring about more change may lose some of its steam as its
political activists become less central to the safeguarding of what had been
won.
Another feature of this means of improving the lot of citizens is that,
once a political victory has been won and the decision takes the form of
law, the legal advocates representing the forces which want to limit the
scope of that political victory are just as capable as those who represent the
interests of the protected individuals or groups. More: while it is the progressive academics and practising lawyers who agitate for political
changes which require new laws of this kind, they are not necessarily the
ones charged with the implementation or decision-making tasks which will
give life to those new laws. This role is most likely to be entrusted to lawyers who can be trusted to interpret, administer and enforce the laws in
light of the conserving principles of rationality and fair process, that is,
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who are willing adherents of the dominant legal discourse. Radicals are not
wanted and will not be found on the judicialbenches charged with the
oversight of administrative and legislative behaviour.
Finally, in this short catalogue of the difficulties associated with treating
legislation as the principal source of law and a progressive tool at that, note
that the pretence that the enactment of legislation should be characterized
as if it were primarily the making of law, rather than an essentially political
act given a peculiar form, cannot wipe away reality. The impact of the new
law will depend on the political-will which gave rise to it and on the politics which emerge around its implementation and enforcement. No one can
know at the time of its creation whether a new law, or legal ruling made by
a court or tribunal pursuant to it, will have a particular effect, no matter
how the law is written or the ruling expressed. For a law to declare "there is
to be no racism", does not translate into an eradication of racism ipsofacto.
Allocation of resources-which depends on political decision-makingthe nature of the existing and potential political will, attendant publicity,
the level of acceptance of the underlying philosophy, the level of support
for, and resistance to, the law or ruling, all will play a part in determining
the impact of the law or ruling. This banal point draws attention to another
set of verities.
As noted, the functionaries of those who oppose legislative reforms
which threaten to interfere with the profitable deployment of private
resources are able to play a role in the drafting and application of the State
intervention on behalf of vulnerable groups. This enables these opponents
to limit the scope of the changes that are obtainable, aided as these defenders of the status quo are by the capacity of wealth owners to threaten an
interventionist government that, if it steps too far out of line, the investment of private resources necessary to the generation of economic welfare
will dry up. This is the starting position which the post-war activists were
trying to get the State to buck. But, as long as the creation of wealth was
left to the private sector and as long as the division of private resources
remained grossly unequal, the limits on State interventionism remained and
lawyers and tribunals drafting, administering and enforcing reformist laws
were operating under political constraints which could be exploited by
opponents of the reforms.
The fact that the overall political environment frames the use of law as a
tool of progressive politics becomes even more salient when the courts are
used as the site of struggle rather than the legislature. While the owners of
wealth cannot use the implicit or explicit capital strike as a weapon and the
judges have their own need to prove themselves independent of all interest
groups-including the wealthy classes-political reality plays a subtle, but
effective, constraining role. A judicial decision which declares a practice
abhorrent or discriminatory or even illegal will have tremendous symbolic
influence and, thereby, the potential to support necessary political change.
But, it is potential for such change, not actual change, which will have been
achieved. To concretize this: when the vulnerable win a decision that, say,
they are being denied the opportunity to rent or buy affordable housing, or
the welfare scheme gives benefits to one gender and not another or the pro-
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vision of access to abortions is not administered evenhandedly, a valuable
statement of principle from an authoritative source has been obtained; but
no funds for affordable housing, more generous and equally applied welfare benefits or for publicly-paid abortions will have been allocated. This
essential step still requires a political decision, political struggle. There is
no guarantee that such a struggle will be won, even though the judicial win
has provided a valuable new bargaining chip. But, the same is not true
when the owners of private resources go to the same "aspiring-to-be neutral" courts to seek relief from government intervention with their deployment of their resources. A judicial win usually takes the form of striking
down such interventionist legislation. No further political act is necessary
for the wealth owners to get the benefit of such a decision. The return to the
previous status quo works in their favour (Hasson, 1982). And it is impossible for would-be progressives who advocate both the appropriateness of
decision-making based on rationality and the use of the courts as a site for
progressive struggle to question the legitimacy of such adverse decisions.
This brings me to another aspect of judicially-made law, the source of
law which, during the 1960s and early 1970s, tended to be downgraded in
importance by would-be progressive lawyers. The argument which follows
makes the point that judicially-developed law provided the boundaries for
the massive, positive State interventions which characterized this period in
our parts of the world. To use a somewhat awkward analogy, the argument
is that judicially-made law provides the base of the legal system and legislatively-produced laws constitute its superstructural component. In line
with this (oft-criticized) Marxian metaphor, the superstructure's contents
and impacts are conditioned by the base. The proposition is that the legal
culture which affects a political decision when it takes the form of law is
itself shaped by the deeply embedded premises of judicially-made law,
premises which progressive forces ignore, and did ignore, to their peril.
As flagged, capitalist relations of production have certain needs which,
necessarily, will be provided by the legal system which supports them.
Capitalism is a process of relentless accumulation of wealth. The mechanism is to allow individuals to use their wealth to pursue their own enrichment. In mature, liberal capitalist democracies, such as Canada, law not
only supports the tenets of liberalism-as sketched above-but also facilitates market transactions that, in turn, enhance both the instrumental needs
of capitalism and the ideological precepts of liberal democracy. There is no
need to detail how the idealized market schema supports the accumulation
of wealth. It is the populist dogma of the day: if each sovereign individual
makes optimal use of her talents and resources, the laws of supply and
demand will ensure the most efficient deployment of the aggregate of our
talents and resources, i.e., the generation and accumulation of wealth
project will be advanced. As this mechanism relies on decision-making by
free and sovereign individuals, it contributes to the liberty of all. Further,
this liberty is given more scope because the more free decisions are made
by individuals, the less need there is for co-ordinating planners, i.e., governments, to make decisions. The role of government should be reduced to
the enlargement of the scope of free decision-making by autonomous indi-
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viduals and to those essential societal planning activities which individuals-for selfish or technological reasons-will not make. (Friedman, 1962;
Hayek, 1976, 1982)
Now, law does not automatically reflect all the needs of capitalist relations of production. Their precise needs are not known at any one moment
of political history. More importantly, law, as an institution, has its own
need to retain its independence and legitimacy. This is largely achieved by
holding out that judicially-made law treats all individuals as legal equals,
regardless of whether an individual is a capitalist or not. The point here is,
however, that law's ability to live up to this legitimating characterization is
limited. Law's autonomy is relative; law's principal task is to maintain and
perpetuate the dominant relations of production, capitalism, and it must do
that when confronted with the choice of being neutral at the expense of system-maintenance. This choice is rarely that starkly before the courts and
there is, therefore, a good deal of give in the system. It is this relative elasticity which was being successfully exploited during the period of State
interventionism described above. But the basic legal requirements of capitalist relations of production were, and are, never given up and continue to
condition any reforms proffered.
The basic legal requirements include the right for individuals to own private property. It is not possible for sovereign individuals to make decisions
about the productive deployment of resources for the pursuit of private
profit unless they have the right to exclude everyone else from that decision-making and from the appropriation of the fruits of that decision-making. Given that the relative autonomy of law and the state of politics may
determine the extent to which private property may be owned, in-roads on
ownership may be made. Historical struggles and material conditions dictate the contents of private property rights. It is a characteristic of mature
liberal capitalist democracies that the right of property will have been cut
down by State intervention in order to blunt the most adverse effects of the
"natural" outcomes of neutral market operations in economies where
wealth is very unequally divided. But this does not negate the exalted place
of private property in the legal regime. Whatever its momentary limits, the
principle is to be safeguarded at all costs. It is this starting proposition
which led the Law Reform Commission of Canada (1976), to state that,
while in a liberal, capitalist democracy, peace, order, good government and
individual liberty were to be pr6tected by criminal law to some extent, the
right to own private property is the most important value of all, so that
theft-the protection of the individual's right to exclude others from his/
hers/its property-was the paradigm of crime.
In the same way, the right to enter into exchanges, the right to enter into
voluntary, private contracts, is basic to a market economy. It, too, is instrumental in advancing the accumulation process and in supporting the tenets
of liberalism by endorsing the sanctity of individual decision-making. Private contract-making, therefore, is a fundamental feature of capitalist-supporting law and is not to be legislated out of existence, although it may be
possible to diminish the right of individuals to enter into any deal they like,
e.g., to hire someone below a minimum wage set by the State, to refuse to
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hire people because of their race, to enter into a deal structured so as to
avoid an impost, etc.
While many legislative reforms of a kind never obtainable through the
courts were won-and continue to be won-the fundamental premises of
judicial law which underpin the basic needs of market capitalism remained
firmly in place. Here I note that, during the period of immense changes in
curricula in law schools referred to above, the compulsory core of law
school pedagogy did not change. To the best of my knowledge, no common
law school did away with prescribing Property, Contract and Criminal Law
as mandatory subjects, usually to be taught in first year. Torts also
remained part and parcel of this bundle of compulsory courses, no matter
how avant garde the faculty thought it was. Torts, of course, primarily
deals with the protection of physical and private property integrity threatened by the conduct of non-contract related individuals, that is, it is judgemade law which is a natural component of the basic legal structures needed
by capitalism. Today, many of torts' functions have been usurped by regulatory agencies, but that does not deny the fact that torts law is perceived as
a "basic" legal institution. While there are other arguments made for the
retention of Property, Contract, Criminal and Torts Law as compulsory
subjects in curricula despite their claim to be reformist, interdisciplinary
and value-free, none of them make as much sense as does the one which
holds that these subjects are compulsory because they are the building
blocks of the legal and ideologic support systems for capitalism in a liberal
polity. (Glasbeek & Hasson, 1987)
The argument, then, is that judge-made law-as opposed to political
conduct which leads to decisions which take the form of law-provides the
structures essential to the working of market capitalism and helps legitimate this kind of political economy by furnishing the means to develop a
supporting ideological framework. The latter is done, in part, by normalizing relationships and conduct which otherwise might call into question our
commitment to the principles of liberty and to the sovereignty of individuals. This is a point tellingly made by the Canadian political philosopher
C.B. McPherson (1968).
In Canada, as in all other mature capitalist economies, wealth is grossly
unequally distributed. One per cent of the population owns nearly 20% of
all of Canada's wealth; the top 10% of the population own 54% of the
wealth and the top 20% share 72% of the wealth. At the other end, the bottom 40% have 1% of the total wealth at their disposal. This provides the
context for exploitation, an opportunity enhanced by the fundamental principles purveyed by the judicial system.
As capitalism is an economic system based on the legal principle that no
owner of property should be told how to use it, wealth owners will do what
suits them. They will not deploy their resources productively unless they
believe this will yield a profit for them. As wealth owners have a clear
choice as to whether or not to invest their property, they can take advantage
of non-wealth owners who, in order to provide for themselves, must invest
the only "property" they own: their talents, i.e., their intellects and physical
capacity, themselves. While some non-property owners-the vast majority
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of people-may have a choice to which property owners they will sell
themselves, they must sell themselves to one such property owner. The
much-cited growth of individual entrepreneurship only seems to be a contra-indication. Most such self-employment is due to the failure to find a
willing purchaser for the labour power of individuals who would rather be
employees. (This argument cannot be made in full here; it is merely
flagged lest the assertion which preceded it is thought to be too crude, too
sweeping; for a discussion of the nature of self-employment, see J. Stanford, 1999). It is this very disadvantageous circumstance which has forced
workers to form unions and to fight off the judicially-made law which,
given its predilections, attempted to outlaw and, later restrict, trade union
activities. It is this built-in inequilibrium which has caused non-property
owners to seek protection from the State by outlawing certain "freely" bargained-for conditions, such as below poverty level wages, unending working days, unsanitary and systemically killing workplaces, etc. In short, the
employment contract is one in which workers must enter and, even if the
contract's conditions are ameliorated by the legalization of some form of
collective bargaining and/or legislative safeguards, conceptually and concretely the employment contract is a coercive contract. It is not the outcome of a voluntary agreement between two individuals who, as sovereign
political and market actors, both determined that to enter into such a contract was in their best interest. Yet, this is what judicially-made law pretends and has managed to normalize. It has made natural something which
is essential to capitalism as a system, a system which thrives on the private
appropriation of the wealth yielded by a socialized mode of production of
that wealth.
To elaborate this crucial point: wealth owners need non-wealth owners
to produce more value than they get for their productive efforts. Courts
help them. Basic law allows them to own wealth and to exclude others
from its uses; it allows individuals to sell part of themselves as if they were
selling beans they had grown or bought, as if they were the owners of a
commodity. The monstrosity of this starting point in a polity and within a
legal scheme supposedly based on the primacy of the individual is wellunderstood, but it is pretended away if its existence raises its ugly head.
This is why, when legislating against trade combinations-as every market
capitalist regime must do-combinations of workers formed to regulate
working conditions are excluded from the strictures of the pro-competition
legislation. These combinations are not to be perceived as organizations to
limit competition in respect of the ordinary subject-matters of trade. In the
language of the Clayton Act: "Labor is not a commodity". But, the fact is
that both the logic of capital and judicially-made law do treat labour power
as a commodity. Further, because the wealth owner/employer has bought
that commodity, it is his/its to do with as he/it wills. A whole range of useful (to the capitalist) "natural" rules and beliefs now become self-evidently
sensible and, therefore, their logic and sacredness unchallengeable. A short
list will do.
The employer's problem is that although, in law, he owns the labour
power he has bought, functionally it remains under the seller's, the
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worker's, control. This contradiction lies at the root of all legal capitallabour conflict. Judicially-made law has come in to create a basis for resolution of this capitalists' problem by loading the dice in favour of employers. It has normalized the assumption that the worker has agreed to subject
her intellectual and physical capacities to the needs of the employer who
has bought them. Thus, while judges readily agree that we no longer tolerate slavery, they hold out that, because contracts of employment are not
coercive, despite the materialfacts to the contrary, the starting point of all
employment relationships-whether governed by collective bargaining
statutes, employment standards legislation or the individual contract of
employment regime-is that they are relationships in which one party (as a
result of voluntary agreement) is under the command of the other. This has
been internalized by policy-makers. As the Woods Task Force (1968)
stated, in a matter-of-fact way, the relationship is one in which it is necessary to maintain a superior-inferior nexus. It is necessary because it helps
the employer extract surplus value or, to put it colloquially, helps the
employer make the worker who controls the sold labour power to work
longer and harder than she might otherwise do.
Note here how deeply embedded the judge-made approach is. When
workers who have the benefit of a formalized grievance process are
enabled to challenge the authority of the employer by fighting penalties the
employer imposed on them for disobedience, for insolence or insubordination, this is seen as a major breakthrough. That this employer right to punish for "offences" of this kind is a premise of the employment contracts of
even the best-protected of our workers, tells us how effective the courts
have been in legitimating what, objectively is, a profoundly anti-liberal
regime. They have done this by using their legitimacy to give the pretence
that employment contracts are just like any other contracts an aura of truth.
The impact of this judicially-made make-believe world is also felt when
activists seek to have the State intervene with the private contract-making
sphere. The influence on the way in which collective agreements are to be
viewed has been noted above. Similarly, the normalization of the selling of
oneself as a commodity has led to the judicial and political assumption that
a worker, as a sovereign individual, has assumed, voluntarily, the risks to
life and limb which inhere in productive activity as an employee. This is
the basis on which common law courts refused to award compensation for
workplace injuries to workers. Gradually, workers won the right to be compensated by having the State create statutory workers' compensation
regimes. Precisely because these do not confront the untruth of the basic
assumptions about risk assumption, they are limited in their coverage and
are always easy to attack as "distortions" of the natural state of things. And,
when it comes to the prevention of harm to workers, the road has been even
more difficult. The sticking points are, first, that workers, as voluntary contractors, should be primarily responsible for the evaluation of the risks
which are acceptable to them and, second, that the State-acting on behalf
of the workers-should not be able to dictate to the employer how he/it
should deploy his/its resources. Consequently, the standards of behaviour
imposed reflect the overwhelming evidence supplied by the egregious and
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repetitive infliction of particular harms. No more, and the enforcement of
even those minimal standards is undertaken reluctantly by the State. New
technologies and processes which might present dangers for the workers
are treated as innocent until proved well and truly harmful, again, as evidenced by the mounting body count. This makes sense only if the worker is
seen as a voluntary risk-taker and the employer as inherently entitled to do
with his/its resources as he/it sees fit. And this is the very bill of goods
which judicially-made law has made acceptable.
What is emerging is that judicially-made law not only materially structures the way in which market capitalism operates, but it also provides a
powerful ideological framework which infects other arenas of political and
legal decision-making. One more illustration is offered to make this point
clearer.
The collection of taxation involves a government, democratically
endowed with this power to take away property owned privately by individuals, deciding to do so. But the sanctity of private property, as laid down
and defended materially and ideologically by judicially-made law, imposes
restraints on governments' ability to tax as they see fit. To take individuals'
money and to deploy and distribute it in ways they would not have chosen
themselves requires continuous justification. Consequently, the taxation of
wealth owners always is under challenge and enforcement of existing taxation rules is a lukewarm exercise, at best. Note, interstitially, that the taking
is, ideologically speaking, just its contentious to judicially-based ideas
when it is the taxation of wage earners' income which is at issue, but that
the enforcement problem is non-existent because the monies due are collected before they come into the hands of these non-wealth owners, that is,
workers. The same line of reasoning, posited on judicially-propagated principles and the attendant ideology, favours the rich when they are to be
taxed but yields very different results when it is applied to non-capitalists.
This has an eye-catching aspect when the entitlements of the very poor are
at the centre of legal-political wrangles.
When democratically-mandated governments create welfare benefits'
schemes, they will be distributing monies obtained from individuals and
using it to satisfy other people's needs. While this may accord with the
wishes of the majority of the taxpayers, there will be many who oppose
such uses of their money. The government will be under constant pressure
to justify~the welfare scheme; there will be politically persuasive pushes to
make the benefits less generous, or to abolish them altogether. Indeed, this
is why it is easier for governments to create and maintain universally available benefits' regimes than targeted ones. Welfare schemes are also resisted
because they interfere with the "natural" operation of labour markets, as
envisaged by unmediated judicially-made law. They enable potential workers to avoid having to sell themselves for below- subsistence amounts, even
though an unfettered "free" contract regime would cause them to do so.
Hence, such schemes tend to be restricted to recipients who are not candidates for the "free" labour markets or those who have shown themselves
willing to sell their labour power but have truly found no one willing to buy
their intellectual and physical talents. Consequently, welfare recipients
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must prove their eligibility. They, and not the State, have the burden of
political and, therefore, of legal proof. When it comes to the collection of
taxes, however, the State must find a plausible justification to convince taxpayers that it is entitled to impose the tax. It has the political and, therefore,
the legal burden of proof when enforcing its tax laws. The rules of welfare
regimes, in sharp contrast to those which regulate taxation, are enforced
enthusiastically, even cruelly. It should suffice to note that welfare cheats
are twice as likely to be imprisoned as are taxation cheats.
To recapitulate: in the immediate post-war period, political and economic conditions were such that capitalist elites came under serious pressure to make concessions to the majority. The idea of citizenship as a
liberal, progressive status was promoted and enriched. Many of the
changes came after fierce extra-electoral and parliamentary actions had
been taken, leading to legislative initiatives which took the form of law.
Even the courts were encouraged to take part in the dynamic movement to
accord respect to the different and the vulnerable. In the U.S., the active
role played by the Warren Court is well-documented and, in Canada, there
were judicial baby steps, such as the efforts to imply a bill of rights in the
constitution. In the main, however, the legal progressive and academic was
involved in legislative and associated administrative reform movements. In
large part this was due to the fact that the courts, because of their institutional role and the nature of dispute resolution in which they engaged, had
never provided any of the advances now deemed to be essential and which
had become winnable in the public, political sphere.
What tended to be relegated to the back of the minds of lawyers of my
ilk was the fact that judicially-made law had established the structuresindividuals as the lynch pin of social organization, the ownership of private
property as a sacred right of individuals, private contract-making as a fundamental institution which ought to be left to private governance, the right
to sell one's labour power-which maintained the material conditions necessary to the workings of market capitalism. Moreover, this judiciallymade law underpinned an ideological framework which aided the maintenance of capitalist relations of production. And, while this was not obvious
during this halcyon period of liberal pluralism, the judicially-propagated
ideology was more libertarian than pluralist. It supported individualism
over collectivism; it promoted the liberty furnished by self-regulation over
the State's regulation of behaviour; it safeguarded the right to do with property as owners wished, free from infringements by collectives and democratically elected governments. While this could not prevent an avalanche
of regulatory reforms which undermined these starting positions, it did help
to curtail the extent of those reforms and, more importantly, it stopped
reformers from being more than that, viz., reformers. The basic legal precepts of capitalism were not challenged seriously, let alone overthrown.
The legal structure and ideology which would permit a return to a more
primitive accumulation process, one less mediated by legislative regulation, remained in place. This potential reversal needed new political and
economic conditions. When these came, the remarkable thing is that the
progressive legal communities turned to the courts for help as they saw the
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gains made during the mid-1950s through the early 1970s disappear. This
is the trend which has made me so pessimistic.
The capitalist economic boom began to fade in the early 1970s, indeed,
some argue that the downturn commenced circa 1968. The dating is not as
important-although it is noteworthy that it began when the progressive
forces still felt that they were making great strides forward-as the fact that
the dimensions of the downturn were staggering. Globally, growth and
investment rates fell to half their previous levels; unemployment soared,
reaching proportions close to those which obtained when the outbreak of
the second world war brought relief; pauperization of the periphery, both
globally and in the nation States of the advanced industrialized world,
intensified. Number crunching is out of place in this essay, but a reminder
that, since these economic changes took hold, food banks have become
institutionalized in Canada-in the year 2000, 130,000 Torontonians use
food agencies every month to survive-anecdotally illustrates what we all
know: the economic recovery, which we are said to enjoy, is one which
reflects the fact that the redistribution efforts of the post-war reform movements have had to be rolled-back sharply, if not reversed.
There has been an economic recovery. Like previous ones, it is based on
the fact that new technologies have been spawned which have permitted
arguments to be made that, for the efficient use of these new technologies,
fundamental changes in labour organization and political and social relations are necessitated. This, combined with the failure of the socialist/communist experiments in the Soviet Bloc and the radical changes in China,
established the conditions for an assault on the progressive trends of the
preceding past.
Germane to the tale being told, the changing economic logic has put
pressure on the organization of work and, thereby, on the relevance of trade
unionism. A return to individual, competitive bargaining has been advocated. Concretely this has been aided by the ability to produce in foreign
parts where labour is unorganized and cheap. This capacity has increased
exponentially by the availability of new technologies and by the tearing
down of State boundaries as the capitalist agenda is less and less seriously
challenged by alternative political models. On the home front, this has
meant concrete and ideological attacks on specific trade unions and unionism in general. The famed dissolution of Patco by the Reagan regime was a
powerful symbolic act which echoed the assault on the coal miners in the
U.K. and which was replicated by the imposition of many statutory
restraints on collective bargaining in Canada (supported by the Supreme
Court of Canada exercising the traditional judicial anti-union role by its
predictably pro-capital reading of the Charterof Rights and Freedoms), the
abrogation of collective bargaining by the New Zealand government (now
reversed in part) and the more recent privileging of individual employment
bargaining over collective settlement of disputes in Australia. Individualism of the kind envisaged and preferred by judicially-made law was back
on the agenda. This was prepared for and fostered in many ways.
Politically, one of the concerns for capitalism in mature liberal democracies is that the universal franchise allows majorities to hold sway over
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minorities. As the ownership of wealth is confined to a tiny minority, the
reason for the fear is manifest. As capitalism's elites tried to contain the
sweep for change which followed the end of World War 11, their thinktanks acknowledged the need to cut-down the reach of electoral democracy. The flip-side to the movement to make corporations act more socially
responsibly, more democratically, was a drive to make the electoral system
less effective. It is in this context that writings such as the very influential,
and tellingly entitled, The Crisisof Democracy: Report on the Governability ofDemocracies to the TrilateralCommission (1975), appeared. Its frank
argument was that there was too much democracy in the advanced industrialized world, impeding the restructuring of the corporate world necessitated by the investment and growth crisis. It is this kind of thinking which
laid the ideological groundwork for the overt and extremely successful
attempts to reorganize macro-economic policy decision-making, taking it
away more and more from electorally sensitive governments and lodging it
increasingly in collaborating globally mobile corporate controllers. An
early example was the formation of the Trilateral Commission (Sklar,
1980). Today, there has been an institutionalization of this trend. The FTA
and NAFTA were nothing but examples of governments agreeingforced?-to give up their rights to tell private property owners how to
behave, diminishing the power of their electors. The ability of capital to
dictate policies directly through its financial organizations-IMF, World
Bank, WTO, BIS, etc.,-which , in turn, are directed by the rulers-using
this term in its Real Politik sense-of the major industrial nations, has furthered this hollowing-out of State-bound democracy. These organizations,
known primarily to the world as acronyms, exercise their ability to fund or
not to fund needy governments in order to promote the wants of transnational corporations as they search the less and less boundaried globe for
cheap resources and labour. The governments of those States, and even
those of the first world States, are reduced to facilitating the access of those
TNCs to the resources and labour markets. As this imposes hardships on
their own citizens, they must help capitalist elites build a new hegemonic
understanding, one which requires each individual to rely on the market for
sustenance and happiness, rather than on a planning scheme which seeks to
provide for people according to their needs. In part, this has led the State
everywhere to use coercion to convince the citizenry to accept the new
entente. The State is being turned into the enemy of the people.
To return to the legal setting: it was not long after their initial successes
that progressive lawyers and academics were met with opposition. In law
schools and in courts-especially at the lower levels-the residual formalistic schools sought to re-establish themselves. While support for this position was rhetorically based on the limitations of law as a non-political
institution and the soundness of a jurisprudence based on the methodology
of reasoning posited on analogizing by reference to established precedents,
it was always a plea for a reinforcement of an ideological take on judicially-made law. This perspective was that courts should act only on the
basis of a shared consensus about social relations, a set of values which
transcend any particular political formation. It always was, therefore, a plea
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to hang on to those very judicially-developed principles which gave libertarianism and capitalism what they needed. But, given years of criticism of
formalism, the popularity and success of those who treated judicially-made
law as anachronistic and the occasional activist-that is, deliberately nonprecedential-approach by superior courts, the cry for a return to narrow
formalism had relatively little resonance, certainly in law schools. There
was, however, a modern-looking jurisprudential school which pushed the
same line but did so more sophisticatedly and which, therefore, sounded
better.
This was the Law and Economics school of jurisprudence. Its tenets are
well-known. Its adherents-as do pure economists like Milton Friedmanclaim that they believe in democracy and, therefore, will live with any democratically-imposed limitations on the operation of market capitalism,
which, they assume, is best left unfettered. Their interest is the promotion of
economic welfare by ensuring that legal regulation, whether it stems from
judges or from legislators, is drafted so as to ensure the greatest amount of
efficiency within the limitations imposed by democratic will. The attraction
of this strand of scholarship is that it purports to provide a neutral, empirically-based approach to the regulation of market activities. Its links to
another discipline--economics-make it difficult for progressive lawyers
to discard it as old-hat formalism. Simultaneously, its basic view that the
purpose of law should support the goals of market capitalism, allows the
Law and Economics proponents to support the very legal constructs which
judicially-made law developed to embed libertarianism and capitalist relations of production. On the positive side, this means support for the individual as the subject and object of society and individual property ownership
and private contract-making as sacrosanct aspects of the centrality of individualism; on the negative side, it means highlighting the aberrational
nature of binding majoritarianism and the planning and co-ordination of
resource deployment for anything but individual advancement.
As the courts already accepted all these premisses, their standing is
enhanced by this school of thinking. The real danger to "efficiency" within
this Law and Economics model is the State. It follows that its advocates
and the many effective and well-heeled lobbyists who fund and hire
them-scholars all over North America get funded by outfits like the
American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Olin Foundation, the Liberty Fund, the Donner Foundation, etc.-ceaselessly urge governments to show that their regulations have been analysed on a costsbenefits basis and to start from the position that there should be no authoritarian regulation at all. Governments, always under political pressure by
the threat of capital strikes, have been bombarded with respectable-sounding ideas about the limitations of giving political demands concrete legal
forms.
In law schools, courses on Law and Economics sprang up everywhere.
Many of North America's law teachers-like many American judgeshave been invited to special seminars in really spiffy places, like Palm
Beach, to study Law and Economics with gurus such as Henry Manne.
Many courses and materials are imbued with the postulates of Law and
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Economics thinking; for instances in one of my areas of research one need
look no further than the two leading teaching books on corporate law
(Buckley et al., 1995; Ziegel et al., 1994). While there was something of a
counter-movement in law schools which identified itself as the Critical
Legal Studies school (CLS) and which was loosely informed by Marxism,
this school has remained on the fringes of law schools-especially in major
U.S. schools. In part, it is the continuing fear of being labelled a Marxist in
the United States-and to a lesser extent, Canada-which contributes to
this lack of prominence; in part, it is due to the fact that the CLS does not
get the kind of financial and institutional support lavished on Law and Economics and, relatedly, in part it is due to the fact that, given the changing
political and economic milieu, the progressive reform agenda pretty well
has run its course and the CLS has less resonance in concrete conditions
than does the Law and Economics movement. Further, a new school of
thinking, postmodernism, has soaked-up much of the leftist, Marxian
thinking which undergirded the work of would-be progressive academics.
Progressive academic lawyers and their allies were being overrun by a
new set of circumstances. From the perspective of this narrative, the most
significant changes included a powerful economic and ideological push to
return to a state of affairs which had prevailed in the early 1900s. There
was a new industrial revolution then, too, which launched a drive for a rearrangement of social relations. That industrial revolution was centred on
the development of electricity, the availability and uses of petroleum, the
invention of the automobile, increased facilities for cross-boundary financial transacting, etc. The new-found confidence it bred soon led to the
establishment of the gold standard, a reflection of the belief in the permanence of the new entente. An earlier form of globalization had evolved and,
with it, a pervasive notion that market capitalism was natural and invincible. Depending as it notionally did on individualistic enterprise, society
was presented as a multiplicity of individuals, requiring no interventionist
regulation. The markets for goods, services and labour were best left to
self-regulation (Walras). Today, as had been the case for at least 20 years or
so, everything combines to drive us into accepting these verities again.
Academic lawyers and their progressive allies have been confronted by
governments which are being pushed, materially and ideologically, to
adopt a position which is the exact opposite to that which pertained when
they scored their victories. Governments are under incessant pressure to cut
the social expenditures which provided a social wage, shielding the citizenry from the more egregious outcomes of the unfettered market. Governments are assaulted on a daily basis to cut taxes which, they are told,
reduce the opportunities of private property owners to hunt for profits.
Contemporaneously, governments are hounded mercilessly to remove the
regulatory framework which, allegedly, interferes with the self-governing
deployment of resources which private property owners should enjoy. Further, governments are urged to stop providing services which the private
sector could supply for a profit-and, therefore, more efficiently-albeit
not universally, as the State is obliged to do.
While different governments respond differently to these pressures on
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them and, therefore, the success rate of the private sector elites differs in
various jurisdictions, the last two decades have seen some serious erosions
of the collective rights of the working class, of the social wage and of the
quality of life which had been achieved by material and economic
advances. As noted, collective bargaining rights have been diluted and, in
some sectors, lost altogether. Or, for another telling example, the minimum
wage has dropped as a proportion of average wages: from the late 60s to
the late 80s, the minimum wage entitlement in Canada was reduced somewhere between 20 and 30% and, recently, the situation has worsened.
Unemployment insurance benefits reached an all-time high in both levels
and coverage in the early 1970s and have now been cut-back savagely
(Drache & Glasbeek, 1992; Yalnizyan, 1998). There has been a dilution of
competition-promoting laws to "help" entrepreneurialism (Stanbury, 1987,
1995), a reduction of the progressivity of income taxation (of which the
introduction of the GST is the most visible manifestation), the setting-up of
watchdogs to ensure that governments do not regulate without giving serious consideration to wealth owners' concerns and/or get rid of irritating
regulations and requirements, for example, Ontario's Red Tape Commission, the 1994 federal threat to introduce a Regulatory Efficiency Act, based
on a U.S. statute which planned to leave it to corporations to decide for
themselves how they should comply with existing regulations, the vetting
of the regulatory structures and proposals for new regulations to ensure that
the prescriptions of the Charterof Rights and Freedoms-aprivate individual's safeguard against State powers-are honoured.
All this, plus cuts in the levels and availability of welfare benefits
schemes and attacks on funding for public health care and education, have
become what governments do, what electoral politics have been about, for
more than two decades. In this context, it is not plausible to think of using
the State to act as a positive force for the improvement of material conditions for the wealth-less classes. The idea of being involved in political
activism in order to get a government to make a decision which, when
translated into legal form, will become a tool for lawyers to use on behalf
of the vulnerable and dispossessed, has become a romantic notion. Reliance on public support to persuade governments to act on behalf of the
majority has lost impetus. Electoral democracy is in retreat. Progressive
lawyers have shifted the ground on which they fight.
One agenda is to hold the anti-people, frankly pro-capitalist, State to
account. A large part of what contemporary progressive academic lawyers
and their allies do is to ensure that welfare schemes--or, more commonly,
cut-backs of welfare schemes-are administered without overt discrimination or arbitrariness. Legislators, the executive and administrators are to
abide by the Rule of Law notions developed by the judiciary as it established its legitimacy as an "apolitical" overseeing institution. In short,
much of the progressives' push is for the maintenance of the procedural
safeguards of liberalism. They have a firm platform on which to operate.
The legacy of the huge strides made in the post-war period in the advancement of liberal pluralism is real. The elites, policy-makers and the public at
large espouse their commitment to the principles of citizenship developed
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during this era. And, there are many new situations to which these broadly
shared views can be extended.
Not surprisingly, the new economic conditions have generated a novel
view of social relations, one which fits in with, and lends support to, the
new entente. This leads to a paradox: many of the most important of the
battles which have to be fought in these new milieux are fought by them in
the very forum which had become marginalized during the previous
reformist times-the judicial regime. Here lawyers'expertise is prized and
progressive academics and lawyers can feel that they are playing a central,
albeit different, role in progressive politics. However, this role is one which
is not intent on changing the hegemonic hold of capitalism, nor is it
intended to play a part in making material gains for the non-propertied
classes. Rather, progressive academics and lawyers are engaged. in moral/
cultural/symbolic contests, or to use the language of the metaphor
employed earlier, they are active at the level of the superstructural components of law. These assertions need a little elaboration.
As to the assertion of the novel nature of the circumstances which
engage progressive lawyers, it is to be noted that there has been an explosion in the number of nations at the same time as the rather imprecisely
labelled phenomenon of economic globalization is taking hold. This has
made nation-bound political rights and entitlements more precarious, more
difficult for each nation State to maintain. The task is made more complex
by the outbursts of cross-nation ethnic reclamations--e.g., Albanians in
Kosovo-and the evolution of extra-national trading blocs and relatively
autonomous regional governing institutions. The ensuing assertions of previously underplayed differences, the new mobilities associated with technological and economic developments, the de-coupling of traditional
relations to land and the creation of extra-national labour markets, have
created social and political turmoil. In the context of porous political borders and invigorated ethnic, racial, gender and nationalist consciousnesses,
waves of immigration, flows of refugees, claims of sex and race-based discrimination, the issues of citizenship, of rights and responsibilities and
respect for different identities, cultures, races, gender and sexual preferences, are raised in acutely troubling ways for mature liberal democracies.
Their rhetorical and formal legal adherence to the principles of equality of
treatment make them hypersensitive to the exponentially increasing complaints about unfairness and discrimination which the new circumstances
are throwing-up. Enter the progressive legal community.
Academics and their allies have fought very hard to establish a scheme
based on rational criteria which can embed, and enlarge the scope of, the
incidents of citizenship of the Marshall kind. In this context, struggles to
have such entitlements entrenched in the polity by obtaining human rights
legislation and by amending the constitution of the land have real appeal to
would-be progressive forces. Once embedded in this way, they will be safe
from governments which can no longer be trusted with the protection of the
civil rights of the vulnerable. Both human rights agencies, subject to judicial review, and the courts directly, when adjudicating constitutionalized
protections, are to be left to patrol the rights and duties of citizens. Much of
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the legal safeguarding of citizenship will be focussed on keeping the now
oppressive State in check. It is majoritarianism, as reflected in governmental decision-making in the new economy, which has become the enemy of
the people, even as the social wage gains made through the State's previous
interventions are sought to be protected. This is a complicated political
position to maintain. The ensuing struggles are suffused by tensions and
confusion as progressive lawyers try to make their mark. The tensions due
to the contradictory stance taken are intensified because the liberalized
economic milieu has given augmented resonance to the arguments made by
right wing elites and their think-tanks.
At the same time that the progressive lobbies are urging the expansion of
citizenship rights to deal with the intensified and ever more visible needs of
immigrants, refugees, the racially, sexually, ethnically and nationally distinct, the more conservative forces are arguing that such interventionism is
unacceptable. There is a vigorous, well-funded effort to repulse the ideology of mutual support which underlies this attempt to enrich the Marshall
model. The reasoning is that to treat differences differently is itself a form
of discrimination. There should be a return instead to a more pristine model
of self-reliance by individuals. Once individuals are provided with an equal
opportunity to participate in market activities, the chips should be allowed
to fall where they may. Specially tailored treatment of people on the basis
of gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, nationality, culture, religion,
etc. is in itself said to be discriminatory. It fragments communities by catering to special interests, rather than building communities by according each
individual member of any community the respect of being treated as an
equal in that community, one who does not need to be given any assistance
to thrive. Equality of opportunity to participate in market activities and
reduction of the State role to that of a facilitator of unfettered market activities will enhance citizenship more than any planning, interventionist programme. While there will be some losers in this grand game, the winners
may-but not must--want to help out these unfortunate people. Private
charity is to pick up the pieces and this, in and of itself, will further community spirit.
There is a push and pull, then, between, on the one hand, citizenship
rights which need a political and social rights' regime which gives scope to
the notions of sharing, altruism, a sense of responsibility to, and respect for,
groups who are "different" and/or which have special needs and, on the
other hand, citizenship rights which reflect the ideological values and concrete needs of a less mediated market capitalistic regime. Progressive academics lawyers and their allies press to establish the primacy of the former
view. But, while they have a number of positive outcomes to which they
can point, their struggles are circumscribed by the limitations of the vision
they pursue. This brings me to a pervasive theoretical/ideological approach
found in the writings and activities of would-be progressive legal academics, an approach which helps them justify their new-found belief that the
possibilities for fundamental change are severely limited.
One of the paradoxes of capitalist relations of production is that, during
this moment of ascendancy, it has had remarkable success in having itself
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portrayed as an anarchic regime, that is, as not providing a basis for a theoretical explanatory framework. The world is characterized as it was in the
early 1900s, namely, as constituted by a multiplicity of individuals. The
notion that a polity is made up of social classes, State institutions, active
political parties and social organizations whose interactions are more or
less predictable and, therefore, permit the development of a theoretical
framework to explain and to predict the workings and possibilities of that
polity, is considered wrongheaded. It is unacceptable in a world in which
fragmentation and difference are to be seen as the major characteristics to
offer "grand narratives". The "grand narrative" of capitalist relations of
production as the basis of oppression, of class analysis as the starting point
for transformative action, is now considered passe, if it ever was seen as
key to the relief of exploitation and subjugation. Today's progressive lawyers' prescriptions for action tend to focus on the establishment of rights
of, and respect for, the "different", rather than on an all out attack on the
unequal ownership of wealth and the right of wealth owners to subjugate
others in their endless pursuit of more wealth. It is the State's worsening, or
maintenance, of inequalities which emerges as a central issue, not the creation of such inequalities by private economic activities. The redress of
civil rights' values, rather than the alleviation of the impact of the operation
of the anarchic markets, becomes the focus of attention. Government,
rather than the private property owner, becomes the immediate target of the
progressive reformer.
Clearly, this is an oversimplified picture. Progressive academic lawyers
and their allies have fought for, and won, some significant battles against
the private sectors. For instance, human rights statutes apply to the private
sector. But, by and large, these legislative schemes are complaint-based
and relatively ineffective, although their symbolic significance is considerable. The application of those human rights statutes are always circumscribed by such criteria as economic and technological feasibility, meaning
that they are to be applied with respect for the needs of private profiteering,
for the prerogative of management. The starting position is that the property owners' interests come first and that the systemic creation of oppressions and discriminations by the supposedly neutral operation of the
market are-while not ignored-relegated to a back burner. Inasmuch as
systemic discriminations are to be taken into account by affirmative actions
of one kind or another, they have had little impact. Employment equity legislation, for instance, imposing requirements to employ a certain number of
discriminated-against people-women, aboriginal people, disabled persons, people of colour, to use the categories found in the ill-fated Ontario
experiment-never requires the private sector to create more jobs. Rather,
employers are limited in their ability to exercise their economic power to
hire anyone they like, but not inhibited in any serious way from exploiting
the abundance of labour power which will hardly have been altered. (Glasbeek, 1995) It is preferred workers-non-aboriginals, white able-bodied
males-who will bear the brunt of redressing systemic discrimination from
which their predecessors "profited". Similarly, the power of the women's
movement has forced governments to do something about the gross ine-
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quality in wages between males and females. But, apart from the Ontario
experiment, equal pay for work of equal value-with all its definitional difficulties-has been applied only to the public sectors, the private sectors
being left to be regulated by the much less effective human rights and
employment standards schemes.
In short, private economic activity has not been ignored altogether as a
focus of oppression but it has not been tackled as directly as have other
sources of discrimination and exploitation. The economic and political circumstances which have led the State to roll back the material aspects of the
Welfare State also have helped give life to an ideological and theoretical
framework which discourages today's progressive lawyers from confronting capital on a class basis. The ever more apparent cleavages between
people based on sexual preferences, gender, colour, creed, race, ethnicity,
nationality, etc., are seen as an argument for conducting a legal war on the
basis of a politics of culture, morality and identity. And, overwhelmingly,
this is what lawyers of my ilk-who once saw the State as a democratic site
for the aggrandisement of citizenship and material welfare---do: eschew
the State as the locus for positive intervention and turn to the courts for
such advances. In Canada, the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms gave this shift in focus a big push.
Earlier on in this piece, attention was drawn to the fact that, in the immediate post-war period, progressive lawyers tended to see law which was the
outcome of executive and legislative political decision-making as their terrain. Their culture infused those decisions with meanings and legitimacy.
Now, instruments such as the Charter-and Mandel (1994, 1998) has
recorded the advent of similar instruments in all advanced industrialized
and industrializing nations as their elites seek to avert the impact of mass
democracy on the restructuring efforts of capital-have driven academic
progressives, who now feel governments to be impotent and potentially
despotic, back to the courts. There, of course, they have to deal with the
familiar old problems: the difficulty of translating court victories into substantive gains and the inapposite nature of the forum for the making of
polycentric decisions. More significant to this paper, to this lament, is the
fact that the Charteronly protects citizenship rights against the State, not
against the private sector. In addition, the Charter rights are abstract in
nature, e.g., freedom of association, of communication, of religion, etc.,
like empty balloons (Russell, 1988) which need to be filled by the courts.
This has several inevitable consequences.
As the identified enemy is the State, all citizens, regardless of their class
position can use the Charter to attack democratically made decisions. The
way in which corporations-behind whose veils the wealth owners of the
nation hide-have been able to use the Charteris well-documented. (Mandel, 1994; Glasbeek, 1989(a), 1989(b); Fudge & Glasbeek, 1992; Bakan,
1997). Precisely because the balloons can be filled by the judiciary, they
tend to be filled so as to dovetail with the tenets of judicially-made law, that
is, in line with the advancement of private property/contract rights. Almost
inevitably, under the Charter,wealth owners have had their right to speak
enlarged so as to protect their right to fund political parties in ways which
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help them safeguard their property interests; commercial speech has been
protected because it aids wealth owners to pursue profits as they are supposed to do, turning political speech rights-like everything else in mature
market capitalist polities-into a commodity; wealth owners have had their
right to privacy enhanced to enable them to better ward off regulators who
have the temerity to inquire into the way in which they deploy their property; wealth owners have been able to use the rubric of religious freedom to
trade on any day they choose, regardless of the desire of other people to
keep some days sacred or heedless of the workers' historic struggles to
limit the power of capital to force them to work on any day it chooses, for
any length of time it decrees; corporations, which are accumulations of
wealth, have been able to exploit the guarantees of the Charter, that is, the
intended outcome of capitalism's project-accumulation for its own
sake-has gained a sort of formal recognition under this liberal political
instrument, etc.
The same logic of the base of law, that is, of law developed by the judiciary to maintain and perpetuate capitalist relations of production, has
made it very difficult for the non-propertied classes to win decisions under
the Charter which have redistributive economic effects. Workers' collectives, trade unions, explicitly supported by democratically elected governments to off-set the power of wealth owners to a limited extent, have been
de-toothed by Charter decisions; the same right of free speech rubric used
by wealth owners to talk politically and to sell their wares has been laid
claim to by workers when they picket to protect their jobs, but the Supreme
Court of Canada has told them that, when this exercise of free speech interferes with wealth owners' rights to trade and to profiteer, their acknowledged Charter right is negated; when the same way to speak-picketingis used by progressive, but non-workers', causes, however, the Supreme
Court of Canada has protected it, etc.
The point here is that, while lawyers lovingly massage these results to
try and make legal methodological sense out of them, these kinds of results
could have been predicted-and were by some (Glasbeek & Mandel, 1985;
Hasson, 1982>-by taking the judiciary's historic role as a guarantor of the
legal needs of market capitalism seriously. That is, these results endorse the
argument that the base of the legal institutions will, if left to reign free-as
instruments like the Charter do-turn law into a conserving force. Progressive lawyers, many of whom already accepted this foundation of law as
unchallengeable, were hamstrung in their efforts to put constraints on capitalism. When progressive lawyers go further, as so many now have done,
and endorse the entrenchment of this judge-made foundation and consciously ground their actions on its logic, their causes are seriously disadvantaged. The Charter results bear this out. As Fraser (1997) has argued,
whenever a claim taken to court under the aegis of the Charter-and, I
would add, under a rubric of common law-requires a political and/or economic restructuring, such as a demand for redistribution of property or for
putting the investment of property under more democratic control, the
claimants are very likely to lose, regardless of the plausibility of their
strictly legal argument. Attempts to use the judiciary to reverse the power

Windsor Yearbook ofA ccess to Justice

2001

relations which underlie the class divisions of our political economy are
non-starters. Why, then, do progressive legal academics and lawyers turn to
the Charter and the courts so much more often than they do to the legislatures today?
The answer is to be found in the fact that the State-bound route no longer
offers them a role. More, regretful as I am to say it, most may have bought
into the argument that totalizing political economic theories are to be discarded because no one theoretical approach can deal respectfully with
everyone's needs and desires. Economic radicalism will not lead to the
proper respect for all peoples. The best that can be done is to reform the
system from within to give substance to the identity and culural needs of all
members of society. This tendency to give up on finding a total alternative
to capitalist relations of production is reinforced by the postmodernist
schools which concentrate on the multiplicity of identities, rather than on
class conflicts. And, relatedly, it is when they act in accordance with those
postmodernist understandings that the forces of would-be progressivity
have had considerable success under the Charterand in the courts.
When class is not an obvious issue, legal politics centred on claims to
redress cultural, moral and symbolic injustices have found willing listeners
in the courts, especially when the claims can be made under the Charter
which, it must be remembered, gives the judges wide discretion and a new
legitimacy as policy-makers. Claims on behalf of people whose sexuality,
gender, race or identity has been represented and treated discriminatorily
or with disrespect by law, have been given sympathetic treatment. To be
treated as equals in a polity which characterizes itself as a liberal one is a
demand which resonates with the courts aware of their newly-crafted roles
as protectors of some of the vulnerable in society. They have been prepared to do their bit. That progressive academics find this worthwhile is
not surprising; indeed, they are right to celebrate these successes: they add
to the citizenship rights of all of us, no mean accomplishment. But, there
are limits.
Fraser (1997) and also Fudge & Glasbeek (1992) have shown that, if the
cultural and symbolic claim calls into question existing wealth and economic distribution, the likelihood of success is diminished. A great deal of
the success is explained by the fact that judges are most sympathetic to a
representational claim when it does not involve a demand that there should
be any expenditure to make the remedy effective. This is supported by the
findings of Lajoie, Gelineau and Janda (1999), who find that courts are
more willing to recognize the rights of lesbians and gay men when there
are no public funds to be expended. This was even expressly emphasised
by the Supreme Court of Canada in its widely hailed decision in M. v. H.
(for a similar observation in a different setting, see Laura Cram(1993), and
also Fudge (2000) and Fudge & Glasbeek (1997), on the European Commission's issue of directives where the bulk of would-be progressive directives are those which do not demand that the member States have to spend
any monies). And, in the area where the progressives have had most success under the Charter,the legal rights' provisions, it ought to be noted that
the procedural protections extended to suspects and accused persons-a
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term which bizarrely qualifies corporations for many, but not all, of the
legal rights' protections-in no way changes the class bias of the criminal
justice system. No more corporations and their owners are treated as criminals, regardless of the harms they do or of the frequency of their deviant
behaviour (Glasbeek, 1989(b)). Despite all the upgrading of Charter-supported protection against coercive police and prosecution practices, the
same kinds of people, those without property to invest, the unemployed
and the poor, are going to jail. Indeed, there are more of those people in
prisons and under State surveillance in Canada per capita than at any other
time in its history. Criminal law, the quintessential guarantor of private
wealth, continues to be class-based law. No amount of success on the cultural, symbolic, identity front, has changed this in any way. Surely all this
ought to be food for thought.
While progressive academics and lawyers argue that participation in representational, cultural, symbolic and identity politics in the courts in no
way negates their efforts to get real change, this neglects the impact of their
willing participation in a political setting where history, numbers and class
take a back seat to a "rationality" bounded by the premisses developed to
support capitalist relations of production, materially and ideologically. I
have elaborated this argument in the pages of this periodical before,
(1989(a); 1990), and will not rehearse the reasoning then offered. It is my
view that the progressive lawyers' use of judicial law has forgotten or
ignored President Roosevelt's rationale for his promise of a new Bill of
Rights in 1944. He justified his constitutionalization of material entitlements, that is, of the kinds of gains a class-based politics would fight for as
a prelude to fundamental change, by arguing that the political rights found
in the Bill of Rights-the sort of abstract rights embedded in our Charterhad "proved inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom
cannot exist without economic security and independence. 'Necessitous
men are not freemen.' ...In our days these economic truths have become
accepted as self-evident." [Emphasis added]
While President Roosevelt was trying to safeguard capitalism, he knew
that equality and democracy would be better advanced by an abandonment
of the pristine features of capitalism and a movement toward a socialist
regime or, at least one in which there had been a dramatic redistribution of
wealth and, thereby, political power. He acknowledged that judicially
developed, inspired and interpreted legal rights, as imported into a Bill of
Rights of the kind that is now found in many advanced industrialized
nations, were an impediment to autonomy and democracy. In our fervour,
largely sustained by the successes of the early post-war years and, more
recently, by the successes in our courts in respect of certain kinds of issues,
progressive academic lawyers have tended to forget this truth. Many have
lost sight of the fact that law in a liberal capitalist democracy will, when
push comes to shove, deny democracy its place, and support liberalism
only to the extent that this is consonant with capital's needs.
This pessimistic perspective on the potential of law as a tool for progress
has led me to the belief that the best an academic can do is to point out the
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limitations of law. Again and again. At the same time, a would-be progres-

sive lawyer should support extra-parliamentary and extra-legal protests,
from OCAP's to those which try to expose the workings of capitalism's
acronyms, the WTO, World Bank, IMF, BIS, NAFTA, APEC, from Vancouver to Seattle to Windsor to Washington to Prague to Melbourne to
Quebec. This does not place lawyers at the centre of meaningful politics.
So be it.
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